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Cooperation among kin is common across the natural world and can be
explained in terms of inclusive fitness theory, which holds that individuals
can derive indirect fitness benefits from aiding genetically related individ-
uals. However, human kinship includes not only genetic kin but also kin
by marriage: our affines (in-laws) and spouses. Can cooperation between
these genetically unrelated kin be reconciled with inclusive fitness theory?
Here, we argue that although affinal kin and spouses do not necessarily
share genetic ancestry, they may have shared genetic interests in future
reproduction and, as such, can derive indirect fitness benefits though coop-
erating. We use standard inclusive fitness theory to derive a coefficient of
shared reproductive interest (s) that predicts altruistic investment both in
genetic kin and in spouses and affines. Specifically, a behaviour that reduces
the fitness of the actor by c and increases the fitness of the recipient by b will
be favoured by natural selection when sb . c. We suggest that the coefficient
of shared reproductive interest may provide a valuable tool for understand-
ing not only the evolution of human kinship but also cooperation and
conflict across the natural world more generally.1. Background
Hamilton’s rule provides a framework for understanding the evolution of altru-
ism among genetically related individuals [1–3]. It states that an altruistic act
will be fitness enhancing if the cost to the altruist (c) is less than the benefit
to the recipient (b) multiplied by the relatedness of the altruist to the recipient
(r). This leads to the prediction that organisms will benefit from recognizing
and preferentially cooperating with kin [2,3]. In humans, this appears to be
the case, with kinship forming a cornerstone of social, economic and political
life across human societies.
However, human kinship comprises not only genetic kin but also kin
through marriage—our affines (in-laws) and spouses. Although the importance
of cooperation among affinal kin has frequently been noted by anthropologists
[4–6] cooperation among affines has typically been either regarded as inconsist-
ent with kin selection [7], or described without reference to evolutionary theory.
Hughes [8], however, argued that even if affinal kin are not genetically related,
they may have a shared genetic interest in the next generation, a hypothesis
empirically tested by Burton-Chellew & Dunbar [9]. Here, we extend these
previous studies, developing a general framework for estimating the degree
of shared reproductive interest that individuals have in their social partners.
The central logic of inclusive fitness theory is that when an altruist’s genetic
kin reproduce, they propagate genes that are identical by descent to those
carried by the altruist [2,10]. However, in sexually reproducing species,
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Figure 1. Shared reproductive interest of a female altruist A in a recipient B who is either her sister-in-law (a) or mother (b,c). Horizontal ties represent siblingship,
vertical ties represent parenthood and equals signs represent reproductive partnerships. Circles are female, triangles are male. The proportion of a symbol that is
shaded represents the coefficient of relatedness (r) to A. A0 and B’ (dashed circles) are the hypothetical future offspring of A and B. The relatedness of A to B is
r ¼ 0.5 in panels (b) and (c) and r ¼ 0 in panel (a). The shared reproductive interest of A in B is s ¼ 0.5 in panels (a) and (c) and s ¼ 1 in (b).
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genes of its reproductive partner. As such, the indirect fitness
returns that an altruist ultimately gains from an altruistic act
will be determined by its genetic relatedness both to the
recipient and to the recipient’s reproductive partner. For
example, while in the absence of inbreeding an individual
may not be genetically related to her brother’s wife, she
will, assuming monogamous mating, be related to her
brother’s wife’s offspring by r ¼ 0.25. The altruist therefore
has a genetic interest in her brother’s wife’s reproduction.
Here, we propose a coefficient that captures the shared
reproductive interest between individuals.2. Estimating shared reproductive interests
In order to measure the fitness benefits that individuals
derive from social interactions with kin of all kinds (genetic,
affinal and spousal), we propose a coefficient of ‘shared
reproductive interest’ (s). This coefficient measures the
genetic interest an altruist has in the future offspring of
another individual, expressed relative to its genetic interest
in its own future offspring. A derivation of s, starting from
Hamilton’s rule [11], is set out below.
Let a focal individual A (the actor) interact with a social
partner B (the recipient) such that the number of offspring
the actor successfully rears to adulthood is reduced by c
and the number of offspring the recipient successfully rears
to adulthood is increased by b. Assuming no other conse-
quences, the condition for this act of altruism to be
favoured is that it increases the actor’s inclusive fitness, i.e.
brB0 – crA0 . 0, ð2:1Þ
where rA0 is the relatedness of an actor to its own offspring
and rB0 is the relatedness of the actor to the offspring of the
recipient. Note that the relatedness of the actor to its own off-
spring is simply the average of the relatedness of the actor to
itself and the relatedness of the actor to the actor’s mate, with
whom those offspring will be produced. That is:
rA0 ¼
rA þ rC
2
, ð2:2Þ
where rA is the relatedness of the actor to itself (which, by
definition, is 1) and rC is the relatedness of the actor to the
actor’s mate. Likewise, the relatedness of the actor to the reci-
pient’s offspring is given by the average of the relatedness ofthe actor to the recipient and the relatedness of the actor to
the recipient’s mate, with whom those offspring will be
produced. This yields
rB0 ¼
rB þ rD
2
, ð2:3Þ
where rB is the relatedness of the actor to the recipient and rD
is the relatedness of the actor to the recipient’s mate. The
measures of genetic relatedness (r) that constitute rB0 and
rA0 can be defined using either pedigree estimates or genetic
markers. Both the ‘actor’s mate’ and the ‘recipient’s mate’
may refer to a specific individual, or alternatively to an
appropriately weighted set of all possible mating partners
in cases where there is uncertainty as to this individual’s
identity (see the electronic supplementary material,
methods). Given the above, the condition for the act of
altruism to be favoured is
sb . c, ð2:4Þ
where
s ¼ rB0
rA0
¼ rB þ rD
rA þ rC : ð2:5Þ
Here, s is the actor’s inclusive fitness valuation of the reci-
pient’s offspring expressed relative to that of the actor’s
own offspring and is defined as conditional upon an act
of altruism taking place. While r is a measure of genetic
equivalence, s is a measure of reproductive equivalence.
To illustrate the application of the coefficient of shared
reproductive interest s, consider the relative inclusive fitness
interest that women have in their brothers’ wives. Although
s can incorporate both paternity uncertainty and inbreeding
(electronic supplementary material, table S1), in this example
we assume a non-inbred population characterized by monog-
amous mating. In such a setting, even though a woman
(individual A) is genetically unrelated to her brother’s wife
(individual B), the former will nevertheless be related to the
latter’s offspring by r ¼ 0.25 (i.e. B’s offspring will be A’s
nieces and nephews). As such, the reproduction of individual
B is half as effective at propagating A’s genes as is A’s own
reproduction. Accordingly, sAB ¼ 0.5 (figure 1a). It is worth
noting that the shared reproductive interest (s) between two
individuals is not necessarily symmetrical. For example,
while A is genetically related to the offspring of her brother’s
wife, the reverse is not true—A’s brother’s wife will be
Table 1. Relatedness of an altruist to various consanguineal and afﬁnal kin according to r and s. The altruist is assumed to be genetically unrelated to its own
mate, with both individuals from a non-inbred population. See electronic supplementary material, table S2 for an extended version.
recipient r to recipient r to recipient’s mate s to recipient
consanguines (genetic kin)
full sibling 0.5 0 0.5
parent (mating with other parent) 0.5 0.5 1
parent (mating with non-parent)a 0.5 0 0.5
niece/nephew 0.25 0 0.25
cousin 0.125 0 0.125
afﬁnes
spouse 0 1 1
sibling’s spouse 0 0.5 0.5
spouse’s sibling 0 0 0
aAssumes that this non-parent is r ¼ 0 to the altruist.
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0.5, sBA ¼ 0).
Next, consider A’s relatedness to her mother. While A’s
genetic relatedness to her mother is r ¼ 0.5, her reproductive
interest in her mother depends upon who her mother repro-
duces with. In a strictly monogamously mating population,
A’s mother will mate with A’s father, producing full siblings
that are as closely related to A as her own offspring. In this
case, the shared interest of A in her mother will be s ¼ 1
(figure 1b). In a non-monogamous population in which A’s
mother mates with an individual genetically unrelated to
A, the resulting offspring will be A’s half-siblings (r ¼ 0.25)
and A will be s ¼ 0.5 to her mother (figure 1c). Typical r
and s values for some standard classes of kin are provided
in table 1.3. Discussion
The coefficient of shared reproductive interest defined here
provides a framework for estimating the fitness benefits
that individuals can derive from social interactions with
spouses and affinal kin (in-laws) as well as genetic kin.
Although we refer to in-laws, a human-specific term, our
analysis can be applied to all notions of extended kin through
mating. We argue that shared reproductive interest represents
a concept that not only is theoretically consistent with inclus-
ive fitness theory and its subsequent derivations and
expansions [12,13] but also lends itself to the empirical
study of social relations among genealogical and affinal kin,
extending the work of Hughes [8,9].
Unlike genetic relatedness, shared reproductive interest is
not usually symmetrical. For example, while a mother has an
interest in the reproduction of her son’s wife, the reverse is
not true, an asymmetry that has been advanced for the evol-
ution of the menopause [14]. Similarly, the increased shared
interest that an actor has in its mother’s offspring if she repro-
duces again with the actor’s father (as outlined above) is the
basis of the ‘monogamy hypothesis’ for the evolution of eu-
sociality [15,16]. Our coefficient also allows the incorporation
of uncertainty about future reproduction, variation in whichhas been argued to underlie differences in human marriage
and inheritance practices including monogamy [17] and
avuncular inheritance [18,19]. Although we have not con-
sidered different classes of individuals (e.g. young versus
old, reproductive versus non-reproductive), this can be
incorporated by considering reproductive value [20], and
the framework could be extended from the dyadic one
considered here to consider the relatedness of the altruist to
multiple social partners.
The idea that kinship can explain and predict instances of
altruistic behaviour is one of the most important insights in
evolutionary theory and can be traced back to Darwin him-
self [21]. Although typically applied only to genetical kin,
we argue that the framework of inclusive fitness can be
extended to understand the evolution of altruism toward
reproductive partners common across the natural world
and, in the case of humans, to affinal kin and spouses. Hamil-
ton [2, p. 16] famously wrote that, on the basis of inclusive
fitness theory, ‘we expect to find that no one is prepared to
sacrifice his life for any single person but that everyone will
sacrifice it when he can thereby save more than two brothers,
or four half-brothers or eight first cousins’. According to our
definition of the coefficient of shared reproductive interest,
we might also add ‘or two daughters-in-law or eight cousin’s
spouses’.
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